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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended), and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from 
a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first 
degree or capital felony. In this case, the Honorable David S. 
Young, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction against 
Mr. Suarez for Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony. 
iv 
STATEMENT OP THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court reversibly err when it utilized 
jurors selected in a manner contrary to statutory and constitutional 
requirements? 
2. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it 
refused to remove a juror for cause who had earlier expressed a bias 
in favor of the testimony of police officers? 
3. Did the prosecution present sufficient evidence to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr, Suarez had not acted in 
self-defense and/or defense of habitation, and did the prosecution 
present sufficient evidence from which reasonable persons could have 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Suarez committed an 
Aggravated Assault? 
v 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defence. 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution 
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah 
Sec, 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, 
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
vi 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402 
Force in Defense of person—(1) A person is 
justified in threatening or using force against 
another when and to the extent that he reasonably 
believes that such force is necessary to defend 
himself or a third person against such other's 
imminent use of unlawful force; however, a person 
is justified in using force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury 
only if he reasonably believes that the force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily 
injury to himself or a third person, or to prevent 
the commission of a forcible felony. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-405 
Force in defense of habitation. 
(1) A person is justified in using force 
against another when and to the extent that he 
reasonably believes that the force is necessary to 
prevent or terminate the other's unlawful entry 
into or attack upon his habitation; however, he is 
justified in the use of force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury 
only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a 
violent and tumultuous manner, 
surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he 
reasonably believes that the entry is 
attempted or made for the purpose of 
assaulting or offering personal violence to 
any person, dwelling, or being in the 
habitation and he reasonably believes that 
the force is necessary to prevent the assault 
or offer of personal violence; or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the 
entry is made or attempted for the purpose of 
committing a felony in the habitation and 
that the force is necessary to prevent the 
commission of the felony. 
(2) The person using force or deadly force 
in defense of habitation is presumed for the 
purpose of both civil and criminal cases to have 
acted reasonably and had a reasonable fear of 
imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury 
if the entry or attempted entry is unlawful and is 
made or attempted by use of force, or in a violent 
and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by 
stealth, or for the purpose of committing a felony. 
vii 
Utah Code * *•:, ^ 6 ~ — 10: 
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Aggravated a s s a u l t - - * . person commits 
aggravated assault it ie commits assault as 
defined in section "6-5-x02 and: 
( a 'i - i n'. e >*: i ona 11 y causes ^ ** r \ ous bod i 1 y 
iniurv < .--. ~-ther ; or 
uses a deao.j -vu^.^i* wi such mectn. 
forc^ li*\^\ to produce death or serious bodil1 
injury. 
(2) Agg 
to i j d degree , 
Utah rod* - ,8 
dl* : -. -;elert iot 
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_ _ j' } nd i v •. dua ] ]u :cr 
' "he pan-1! : L ^ of j.ir -
, r-i] K^ serve at a particular court *~* 
*-r.a? of a particular action. A 
cnallenge to the panel is an objection made 
to all i~v * > m m o n o d ind ,-v/ be taken 
either 
(i ) A -•:-ia 1 \ enge to t:•)- pan*-; - a;i 
be founded only on a material depart i: *-
from the procedure prescribed with 
respect to the selection, drawing, 
summoning and return of the panel, 
(ii) The challenge to the panel 
shall be taken before the jury is sworn 
and shall be in writing or recorded by 
the reporter. It shall specifically set 
forth the facts constituting the grounds 
of the challenge. 
( ii i ) If a v...a *. t c..gt . • i« i .. • • 1 
is opposed by the adverse party f a 
hearing may be had to try any question 
of fact upon which the challenge is 
based. The jurors challenged, and any 
other persons,, -ay be called as 
witnesses at -,*-- u ^ r i n * *•!-•--on. 
v i i i 
(iv) The court shall decide the 
challenge. If the challenge to the 
panel is allowed, the court shall 
discharge the jury so far as the trial 
in question is concerned. If a 
challenge is denied the court shall 
direct the selection of jurors to 
proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror 
may be either peremptory or for cause. A 
challenge to an individual juror may be made 
only before the jury is sworn to try the 
action, except the court may, for good cause, 
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn 
but before any of the evidence is presented. 
In challenges for cause the rules relating to 
challenges to a panel and hearings thereon 
shall apply. All challenges for cause shall 
be taken first by the prosecution and then by 
the defense. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection 
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or 
more of the following grounds: 
(14) That a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will prevent 
him from acting impartially and without 
prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
party challenging; but no person shall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the 
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, 
founded upon public rumor, statements in 
public journals or common notoriety, if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the 
juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to him. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-46-1 
Short Title, 
This act shall be known and may be cited as 
the "Jury Selection and Service Act." 
ix 
Utah Code Ann, % 78-46-2 
Jurors selected from random cross section-
Opportunity and obligation to serve. 
It is the policy of this state that persons 
selected for ]tity service be selected at random 
from a fair cross section of the population of the 
area served by the court, and that all qualified 
citizens nave the opportunity in accordance with 
this act to be considered for ]ury service and 
have the obligation to serve as jurors wh^n 
summoned fir fhit purposp 
Utah
 t 0 ( j e ^nn, S >8- 4b-I3 
Procedure when shortage of jurors drawn--
(4) 1L Uieru i*> an unanticipated shortage of 
available trial ]urors drawn from a qualified jury 
wheel, the court may require the clerk of the 
court to summon a sufficient number of trial 
jurors selected at random by the court from the 
qualified ]ury whoel. 
Utah Code Ann, h7ti -46-]6 
Jury not selected in conformity wilh chapter-
Procedure to challenge—K^l I -»f avnlable--
Exclusive remedy. 
(1) Within seven days after the moving part-/ 
Jibcovered, or by the exercise of diligence could 
have discovered, the grounds therefore, and in an/ 
event before the trial jury is sworn to try the 
case, a party may move to stay the proceedings or 
to quash an indictmentr or for other appropriate 
relief, on th*3 ground of substantial failure to 
comply with thii art in selecting a grand wr iriil 
jury. 
I M 11 L »> i TI not i on iiied under this section 
containing a sworn statement of acts which, if 
true, would constitute a substantial failure to 
comply with this act, the moving party is entitled 
to present testimony of a iury commissioner, the 
clerk of the court, any relevant records and 
papers nnf publi^ or otherwise available used by 
the jury commission or the clerk, and any other 
relevant evidence. If the court determines that 
in selecting either a grand or a trial jury there 
has been a substantial failure to comply with thii 
act, and it appears that actual and substantial 
injustice and prejudice has resulted or will 
result to a party in consequence of the failure, 
x 
the court shall stay the proceedings pending the 
selection of the jury in conformity with this act, 
quash an indictment, or grant other appropriate 
relief. 
(3) The procedures prescribed by this 
section are the exclusive means by which a person 
accused of a crime, the state, or a party in a 
civil case may challenge a jury on the ground that 
the jury was not selected in conformity with this 
act. 
xi 
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THE STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Res p o n d *:" 111 •,,. 
v, 
GIliBERTO SUAREZ, 
De f e ndan t/ Appe 11 a n t. , 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Th is i ,s an a p p P a 1 f r o in a j u d q me n t a n < 3 c :> i i v i :: t ii :> i I f • : i: 
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.^  La^a . i .,.
 f ••.<*.--- >>i; ,La: , • <•- -lonorar .e 
D a v M s. Yocng, Judge, p r e s i d i n g . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appel 1 -?r ';i l ^  ^ * ^  Sui r-- ' - j ° " - "? > • - 7 * 
;*. - . * i vy-i.,- ,.* . : . r q a m e t v ti '-e - i Elf-em**- i f M n a a r . 3 1 , 
N 11 <- K a r « *p o nd r ,-* t , i - ^ j *• -** ^ *-* 3o*v . 
S0 3 0 a - C A 
part of the Superbowl football game on televisionf drank at least 
two but not more than four beers, and waited for his family to 
return (R. 110 at 35-36). Mr. Suarez was unsure of where his wife 
was and testified at trial that he was worried (R. 110 at 45). At 
approximately 10:00 p.m., his children and his wife Karen returned 
to his home accompanied by a slender woman whom he did not recognize 
(R. 110 at 35-36). The slender woman was Elizabeth "Pat" 
Poleviyaoma who lives with Leon Boone, the recipient of a chest 
wound in this case (R. 109 at 28, 65-66, 76). 
Karen Suarez had been at the home of Leon Boone and Pat 
Poleviyaoma since the time she had left the home earlier that 
afternoon (R. 109 at 66). Mr. Boone and Ms. Poleviyaoma had 
accompanied Karen to the grocery store to buy a case of beer for 
consumption during the Superbowl telecast (R. 109 at 66). Karen 
also had with her a fifth of whiskey, which was consumed by her and 
two other adults at this Superbowl telecast (R. 109 at 67, 81). The 
case of beer was consumed by all five of the adults watching the 
Superbowl television game (R. 109 at 66-67, 81). After the 
broadcast of the Superbowl game, Mr. Boone and Ms. Poleviyaoma 
offered to give Karen Suarez and the children a ride home. She 
accepted. Ms. Poleviyaoma accompanied Karen Suarez into the home, 
helping her with a sack of groceries she had purchased while at the 
store and, at her request, she stayed to dissipate an argument 
(R. 109 at 68-71). The argument continued despite her presence. 
At some juncture during the argument, Ms. Poleviyaoma 
encouraged her child, who had accompanied them inside the Suarez 
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hir in i I i ! J ll iiiiiiof mire
 9 tin; t e s t i m o n y d i / e r g t - s as t o 
wh-i>- occu r:; eo n^ * *: „ 
M*- ioone t e s t i f i •• 
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Karer « -
 t en 
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0-. r , h*- s e n ^ e : ;.»!!i*at> : MJ — I * ,. s<~. ^ o ^ e ^ 'JP f e l t c ; -; t • -•? 
.yaoma o f *-
J u< - .• ^ra.i.r-3; :tii'j j o ;e *!e - 1 i i eo v^ - ^ v i / a o n a ' s 
t e s t i m o n y ve ry c i o s ^ y p a r a l l e l e d t h a t of Mr. Boone (R. ±i t 
6C»»88) . 
Mr S u a r e z , on t h e o t h e r hand , t e s t i f i e d t h a t Mr, Hoone 
e n t e r e d ino horn** s u d d e n l y , oarn^ d i r e c t ! ^ ' i< Mr r»n n n<
 ( m i i ± 
in Ill .UdiH'i', ,i ehesi ani 1 pushed h mi IN, I 111 at 3 9 ) , 
-.' « i a a r e z had been h o l d i n g h i s c h i l d / d t t e m p t i n g t o keep h i b ^ i f e 
from leaving again, and he complained that Mr. Boone wanted to fight 
with him and that Mr. Boone's push nearly caused Mr. Suarez to fall 
on top of his young daughter (R. 110 at 38-40, 51-52). 
Mr. Suarez testified that he had his camera in hand and 
pushed at Mr. Boone with his left hand to get him out the door; the 
camera broke on impact (R. 110 at 40-41, 52-53). Mr. Suarez 
conceded he attempted to kick Mr. Boone but missed because Mr. Boone 
was falling backward (R. 110 at 53). Mr. Suarez denies he had a 
knife when he pushed Mr. Boone (R. 110 at 41). 
Police Officer Chris Housley of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department testified for the State and admitted that immediately 
after the incident, he took a statement from Mr. Boone at the 
hospital. Mr. Boone's statement to him closely paralleled the 
testimony of Mr. Suarez; to wit: That Leon Boone had entered the 
apartment where Mr. and Mrs. Suarez were arguing and physically 
tried to restrain the argument by getting between them; he admitted 
pushing Mr. Suarez (R. 110 at 10-11). 
After the incident, while others awaited the arrival of 
the paramedics and the police officers, Mr. Suarez left his home out 
the back door, walking toward his work (R. 110 at 43). Police 
officers instigated a search for Mr. Suarez, and Police Officer Gary 
Coonradt sighted someone fitting the description of Mr. Suarez 
walking along State Street (R. 110 at 18). The officer stopped the 
man and asked him for identification, at which point, the individual 
identified himself as Robert Trujillo (R. 110 at 19). The 
individual claimed to have no identification. Police Officer 
- 4 -
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veniremen ai 4 
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jcause 
they were police ofricers and that he believed police officer- were 
- : 
right ninety-five percent of the time (R. 55-56; R. 110 at 25). 
Mr. Wolford had been excused for cause in that court based on that 
answer, and Mr. Suarez requested he similarly be excused for cause 
from service on his panel (R. 55-56; R. 110 at 25). The Judge 
refused to excuse Juror Wolford for cause (R. 110 at 27)/ and 
Mr. Suarez therefore utilized one of his peremptory challenges to 
remove Mr. Wolford from serving on his jury (R. 88). 
At the end of the State's casef Mr. Suarez made a motion 
to dismiss the charges against him based on insufficiency of the 
evidence (R. 110 at 24). The trial court denied that motion (R. 110 
at 28). 
Ultimately/ the case was submitted to the juryf who 
returned after deliberations with a verdict of guilty as charged 
(R. 110 at 85) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Contrary to constitutional and statutory provisions, the 
trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing thirteen members 
of Mr. Suarez's jury venire to sit as panelists despite the fact 
they had been rejected from jury service that very morning in 
another criminal case rather than from the statutorily prescribed 
manner of jury selection. 
The trial court erroneously denied Mr. Suarez's challenge 
for cause of a particular juror who had demonstrated bias, thereby 
requiring that Mr. Suarez exercise a peremptory challenge to excuse 
that juror in contravention of his constitutionally safeguarded 
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right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
The State did not carry its burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Suarez had not acted in self-defense 
and/or defense of habitation when Mr. Boone had entered his home in 
an aggressive and violent manner. Neither did the State present 
sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Suarez had used a dangerous weapon, a knife, inasmuch as no 
evidence was presented that a knife had been seen or found nor any 
testimony presented that the wound on the victim's chest was 
consistent with a knife. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
UTILIZING JURORS PREVIOUSLY EXCUSED FROM ANOTHER 
COURT'S VOIR DIRE PROCESS OF THAT SAME DAY OVER 
THE OBJECTION OF COUNSEL. 
On March 31, 1988, the jury selection process began in 
the trial of Mr. Suarez. Following a short recess from that 
process, a mistrial was granted and the jury panel in its entirety 
dismissed from service (R. 108 at 4). The trial court granted the 
mistrial in part because Mr. Suarez's in-custody status had been 
disclosed to the jurors and in part because of an insufficient 
number of panelists to allow counsel from both sides to exercise 
their respective peremptory challenges (R. 108 at 5). The trial 
court then requested that the jury clerk for the court prepare a new 
jury list and provide a list of jurors available for a new start for 
that same afternoon (R. 109 at 3). The trial court contemplated to 
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fulfill any shortfall in potential jurors by utilizing jurors who 
were not used in either of two criminal trials being held 
concurrently that morning (R. 109 at 8-9). 
Upon returning from the lunch hour, Mr. Suarez objected 
to the new panel. Counsel stated: 
My objection is based on both constitutional and 
statutory grounds in regards to the fact that 
apparently thirteen of the twenty-two jury 
panelists are those that have been already in 
Judge Russon's court this morning and those which 
were not selected for the criminal case which is 
pending before Judge Russon. 
On constitutional grounds, my objection is based 
on the fact that both the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantee a 
criminal defendant a fair and random cross-section 
of people to serve on his jury. 
In my opinion, the fact that these particular 
thirteen jury panelists have already been 
essentially rejected from use in Judge Russonfs 
court on a criminal case means that they are no 
longer, that the panel no longer is a fair and 
random cross-section of the community. 
My statutory concern is based on the fact that 
under §78-46-13(4), which is the statute 
instructing the selection of jury panelists, it 
indicates that "if there is an unanticipated 
shortage of available trial jurors drawn from a 
qualified jury wheel," which I think is the 
situation we're in, the statute indicates as 
followsf:] "The court may require the clerk of 
the court to summon a sufficient number of trial 
jurors selected at random by the court from the 
qualified jury wheel." 
In my opinion, the thirteen that we have from 
Judge Russon's court do not comply with that 
standard and that mandate in the statute because 
they are no longer a random sample selected from 
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the qualified jury wheel but instead come from 
Judge Russon's court. 
In my opinion, what we need to do, unfortunately, 
is start again the process anew by selecting 
twenty or twenty-two jurors from the regular 
processes and starting, perhaps tomorrow morning 
or whenever the court's calendar can accommodate 
us (R. 109 at 3-5). 
The trial court denied that motion (R. 109 at 13), and the jury 
selection process went forward. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
guarantee an accused a fair trial by an impartial jury. Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 
357, 363 (1979). The right to a fair trial by an impartial jury has 
been defined by the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court to require the selection of trial juries from a representative 
cross-section of the community. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 574 
(Utah 1987) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 148-49; 
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 363). 
The Jury Selection and Service Act (hereinafter "the 
Act"), codified at Utah Code Ann. §78-46-1, e_t. seg., lays out the 
requisite procedures for jury selection. Section 2 of that Act 
states as the policy of the State of Utah that persons selected for 
jury service be selected at random from a fair cross-section of the 
population of the area served by the court. Section 13(4) mandates 
that "if there is an unanticipated shortage of available trial 
jurors drawn from a qualified jury wheel, the court may require the 
clerk of the court to summon a sufficient number of trial jurors 
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selected at random by the court from the qualified jury wheel." 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah Code Ann, §77-35-18(c), 
allows challenges to be made to either the panel as a whole or an 
individual juror. 
In this case, Mr. Suarez followed Section 16 of the Act 
and Rule 18(c)(l)(i) in that he challenged the panel correctly 
claiming a material departure from the procedure prescribed within 
the Act with respect to the selection and drawing of the jury 
panel. Mr. Suarez asserts that the actions of the trial court in 
denying his motion violated his substantial rights in that his jury 
panel was no longer demonstrative of a random sample from a fair 
cross-section of the population as guaranteed him by statute and 
state constitution. The statutory requirements of Section 13(4) of 
the Act was not followed as thirteen members of Mr. Suarez's panel 
was composed of individuals already rejected by the court, the 
prosecution, and the defense in another criminal trial earlier that 
same morning. Those thirteen veniremen were not chosen at random 
from the qualified jury wheel as required. (See Addendum A for copy 
of jury venire in Judge Russon's court.) 
Therefore, for clarification, Mr. Suarez is not 
challenging the constitutionality of the method of securing jurors 
to make up the master list as presented in State v. Tillman, 750 
P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), and State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 
1988). Rather, Mr. Suarez asserts that the trial court's failure to 
follow the required process in obtaining a jury venire violated 
statutory and constitutional restraints and prejudiced his 
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substantial rights. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar such claim 
where the appellant challenged a failure of the jury clerk to follow 
statutory guidelines in State v. Beasley, 454 P.2d 880 (Utah 1969). 
The Utah Supreme Court found that the names of the persons on the 
jury list for the prior year should not have been held over and 
included in the list for the subsequent year, and that Court opined 
that such a deviation from the statutory guidelines was error. 
Admittedly, the Court concluded that appellant failed to show any 
prejudice by that deficiency and, in doing so, affirmed his 
conviction. However, unlike appellant in State v. Beasley, 
Mr. Suarez does effectively demonstrate such prejudice. 
In the case at bar, Mr. Suarez was prejudiced by the 
process utilized to formulate his jury venire because thirteen of 
the twenty-two potential jurors had been previously rejected by the 
court and both counsels for the trial in Judge Russon's court. In 
effect, those thirteen jurors had been picked over. Some had been 
excused for cause, others peremptory challenged, and still others 
extra veniremen. Perhaps most demonstrative of prejudice is that 
six of the eight jurors actually empaneled in the instant case were 
from the thirteen improperly acquired panelists. Moreover, 
Mr. Suarez was shorted his full compliment of peremptory challenges 
because of the Court's refusal to grant a challenge for cause where 
a venireman made biased statements during voir dire in front of the 
Honorable Leonard H. Russon but remained silent on that same point 
in this voir dire (see Point II, infra). 
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This behavior, and State v. Beasley discussed above, 
displays another serious problem when the same veniremen experience 
voir dire questioning in two courtrooms in succession on the very 
same day. Veniremen who so choose may learn from the earlier 
experience and answer—or fail to answer—in ways which will 
facilitate their desire either to sit or not sit as a juror in the 
second case. This potential problem is also repudiated by the Act, 
Section 11, and the discussion in State v. Beasley, requiring that 
the jury wheel be emptied of prospective jurors' names each year in 
December and then refilled presumably to limit any chance of 
successive jury service to only a possibility of months or years 
rather than hours as occurred in this case. Cf. State v. Beasley, 
454 P.2d at 882-83 (concurring opinion, Ellett, J., joined by 
Callister, J.). 
Mr. Suarez thereby asserts that he incurred prejudice to 
his substantial rights when the trial court refused to quash his 
jury panel to which members had been unlawfully added. Accordingly, 
he requests that this Court reverse his conviction. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO GRANT MR. SUAREZfS 
CHALLENGE OF A JUROR FOR CAUSE REQUIRING HIM TO 
USE A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE. 
During the jury selection process, Mr. Suarez moved the 
trial court to excuse for cause a juror, Mr. Harry Wolford, inasmuch 
as he had previously expressed a bias in favor of testimony of 
police officers (R. 110 at 25-27). The trial court, however, denied 
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that motion (R. 110 at 27), and Mr. Suarez was then forced to 
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove Mr. Wolford from the panel 
(R. 88). Mr. Suarez asserts that the trial court's refusal to 
dismiss Juror Wolford for cause constitutes reversible error. 
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article lf Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
afford an accused the right to a trial by an impartial jury. 
Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure safeguards this 
right to an impartial jury by permitting the accused to challenge 
for cause and eliminate from jury service any juror who displays 
bias against him. Rule 18(e)(14), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.! The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that the 
procedural rule and the Utah Constitution are violated and reversal 
of subsequent convictions required whenever a trial court fails to 
excuse a biased juror for cause, thereby forcing the defendant to 
1
 Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides in pertinent part: 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a 
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of the 
following grounds: 
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part 
of the juror with reference to the cause, or to 
either party, which will prevent him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of the party challenging; but no 
person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason 
of having formed or expressed an opinion on the 
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, 
founded upon public rumor, statements in public 
journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily 
appears to the court that the juror can and will, 
notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and 
fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
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utilize a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. See State v. 
Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987), and cases cited therein. 
In the instant case, Juror Harry Wolford was one of the 
thirteen jurors who had been excused from jury service in the other 
courtroom (see Point I, supra). Mr. Wolford had specifically been 
excused for cause in Judge Russon's court because during voir dire, 
he stated that he tended to give the testimony of police officers 
more weight simply because they were police officers and, further, 
that he believed police officers were right ninety-five percent of 
the time. An affidavit from counsel in Judge Russon's courtroom was 
provided, establishing the statement of Mr. Wolford during that voir 
dire (R. 55-56). 
During the voir dire in Mr. Suarez's case, it is true 
that Mr. Wolford did not so similarly respond. However, the case 
law in this jurisdiction discloses that even a subsequent 
denouncement of a prior statement of bias is unable to substantially 
rehabilitate the earlier statement. State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 
801-02 (Utah 1977). Moreover, the circumstances of the voir dire in 
Mr. Suarez's case unveils practical considerations explaining Juror 
Wolford's failure to reiterate his earlier response. 
The trial court questioned the jurors as a group, asking 
whether any of them were acquainted with or closely related to 
police officers (R. 112 at 15). The court transcript reveals that 
several jurors responded that they knew or were related to police 
officers (R. 112 at 15-20). The trial court then asked each who had 
responded whether, considering the relationship(s), they could be 
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impartial. The first juror responded "no." The second juror, 
Ms. Lloyd, however, answered "maybe" (R. 112 at 16). The trial 
court then asked a follow-up question, "Do you have any reason to 
believe that you would believe a police officer simply because he is 
a police officer more than any other citizen who testified?" 
Ms. Lloyd responded "yes, I think I would" (R. 112 at 16). The 
trial court then questioned both Ms. Lloyd and a subsequent juror at 
length in a rather curt manner which undoubtedly cautioned and 
forewarned other jurors to avoid a similar response (R. 112 at 
16-18) (See Addendum B for transcript of the complete colloquy.) 
Ms. Lloyd was excused for cause by the trial court (R. 88). 
Notably, when the trial court reached Mr. Wolford, he did 
not ask him individually whether he would give greater weight to the 
testimony of a police officer or whether he would believe a police 
officer ninety-five percent of the time. Rather, he asked him only, 
"Would you be inclined—would your acquaintance with Jim Grant cause 
you for any reason to feel you could not be fair and impartial in 
this case?" Mr. Wolford responded "no" (R. 112 at 19). At that 
juncture, the court questioned several other jurors, only then 
returning to ask the more important question at issue here as a 
group question: 
Let me ask the broad question, which I think I've 
perhaps alluded to with the rest of you, that are 
there any of you who would believe that the 
testimony or weight of testimony of an officer 
should be weighed greater than the testimony of 
another citizen for any reason? And I would 
include the inverse of that. Is there anyone who 
would believe an officer's testimony should be 
weighed less than any other citizen? (R. 112 at 20) 
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The transcript then discloses the Court's comment that, "There 
appears to be no affirmative response" (R. 112 at 20). Mr. Suarez 
asserts that the colloquy between the trial court and the initial 
jurors on this question induced Mr. Wolford to not respond as had 
Ms. Lloyd and as he had earlier in the Honorable Leonard H. Russon's 
court. 
In any event, the statement made by Mr. Wolford during 
the voir dire in Judge Russon's court remained unrebutted by the 
prosecution and a valid claim of bias mandating an excusal for cause 
by the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
When the voir dire evokes a strong emotional 
response, there is posed a warning that the juror 
may not have a mental attitude of appropriate 
indifference to the party or cause before the 
court . . . [Biased on the juror's expressed 
feelings, attitudes, and opinions, the trial court 
must determine by a process of logic and reason, 
based upon common experience, whether the juror 
can stand in attitude of indifference between the 
state and the accused. 
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d at 878, 884 (Utah 1981). More recently, 
the Court reaffirmed that position in State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 
475 (Utah 1987), when it stated: "When a perspective juror 
expresses an attitude of bias, a later assertion by the juror that 
he or she can render an impartial verdict cannot attenuate the 
earlier expressions of bias." In both Jones and Brooks, the Court 
held that the failure to excuse a juror for cause and thus compel a 
party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the biased juror 
was prejudicial, mandating reversal. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d at 
474-75 and Brooks, 631 P.2d at 883. In Brooks, the two jurors at 
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issue should have been excused for cause from the burglary trial 
before them as they both expressed attitudes of bias regarding 
burglars because they both had sufferred prior burglaries. In 
State v. Jones, the two jurors who should have been excused for 
cause both knew members of the victim's family and stated that their 
associations would affect their impartiality. Both situations are 
analogous to the case at bar, and other decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court are even more directly on point. 
in State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980), the 
trial court asked, "Are there any of you who believe you would be 
inclined to give a testimony of a police office greater weight than 
you would the testimony of someone who was not a police officer?" 
Two jurors responded affirmately. One was removed for cause; the 
other the trial court attempted to rehabilitate. However, the Utah 
Supreme Court found the failure of the trial court to excuse the 
other juror for bias, or alternatively to investigate further until 
the inference of bias was rebutted, as prejudicial error mandating 
reversal. Ij3. at 768. The Utah Supreme Court stated that 
[i]t was prejudicial error for the District Court 
to force defendant to remove by peremptory 
challenges two jurors whose voir dire testimony 
raised an unrebutted inference of actual bias. "A 
party is entitled to exercise his three peremptory 
challenges upon impartial prospective jurors, and 
he should not be compelled to waste one in order 
to accomplish that which the trial judge should 
have done." 
State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768 (quoting in part, Crawford v. 
Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975)). 
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In State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (Utah 1984), the 
defendant challenged three different jurors for cause. The trial 
court granted one and denied the other two, forcing the defendant to 
exercise peremptory challenges to excuse those two. One of the two 
jurors had stated that he had training in drug abuse as a police 
officer in the Army and that he knew several officers including one 
of the detectives on the case with whom he had gone to high school 
twenty years previously. However, upon questioning by the judge, 
this juror unequivocally stated he would look to the facts of the 
case impartially. The trial court found a lack of bias requiring 
excusal for cause as to this juror and upheld the trial court's 
action. JEd. at 25-26. 
However, as to the second juror, the Court found error. 
During voir dire, this particular juror had replied: "As far as 
being impartial in the case, I—if the evidence did point to their 
not being guilty, I could be impartial. However, if the evidence 
came in anywhere near being close, then I would feel like the 
detectives deserve the benefit of the doubt as far as the 
evidence." ^d. at 26. The trial court found that these and later 
comments clearly disclosed that this particular juror "had strong 
and deep impressions with regard to the veracity of police officers' 
testimony and would credit a police officer's testimony to an undue 
extent." idk at 27. The Court ruled that this juror should have 
been dismissed for cause inasmuch as the failure to do so forced 
defendants to use one of their peremptory challenges to remove the 
juror. Jj3. Prejudice occurred, the convictions were vacated, and 
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the case remanded for a new trial. Id, 
In the case at bar, Mr, Wolford's statement that he 
tended to give the testimony of police officers more weight simply 
because they were police officers and that he believed police 
officers were right ninety-five percent of the time demonstrated 
bias. The statement was supported by affidavit and remained 
unrebutted by the State. The requested excusal for cause based on 
bias should have been granted. As stated in State v. Jones, when a 
prospective juror expresses an attitude of bias, a later assertion 
by the juror that he or she can render an impartial verdict cannot 
attentuate the earlier expressions of bias. State v, Jones, 734 
P.2d at 473. This error by the trial court prejudiced Mr. Suarez by 
requiring him to exercise a peremptory challenge, thereby 
diminishing the statutory grant of peremptory challenges violating 
his right to due process as well as the right to an impartial jury. 
The Utah case law on this question is substantial and 
specifically recognized reliance on Article I, Section 12 as a basis 
for the decisions. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d at 474; State v. 
Brooks, 563 P.2d at 801. Accordingly, the United States Supreme 
Court decision of Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. , 108 S.C. , 101 
L.Ed.2 80 (1988), which facially appears to retreat from the Utah 
position is not dispositive on this question. Ross v. Oklahoma is 
further distinquishable because the underlying case law requirements 
of Oklahoma departs from the long-held Utah position. Compare 
Ferrell v. State, 475 P.2d 825, 828 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970), and 
Stott v. State, 538 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (both 
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cited in Ross v. Oklahoma/ 101 L.Ed.2d at 91 for the proposition 
that reversible error occurs in this context only when the erroneous 
juror is removed by a peremptory challenge, all other peremptory 
challenges are exhausted, and an incompetent juror is forced upon 
the defendant), with State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), and 
State v, Jones, 734 P.2d 473 (Utah 1987) (reversible error occurs 
after a showing that a peremptory challenge is used to remove a 
juror who should have been removed for cause). 
Therefore, rejecting the recent federal decision is 
prudent and consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's expressed 
willingness to establish and maintain distinct interpretations of 
federal and state constitutional questions where appropriate. See 
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 
(Utah 1985), (Zimmerman, J., concurring); and Comment, The Utah 
Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L.Rev. 
319. See also State v. Caraher, 653 P.2d 942 (Ore. 1982) (State of 
Oregon remains free to interpret its own constitutional provisions 
and to impose higher standards under the state constitution than 
required by the federal counterpart). 
In fact, the Oregon Supreme Court opinion discloses what 
could be an ex post facto effect and a due process violation as this 
issue relates to Mr. Suarez if, in fact, reliance were placed on 
Ross v. Oklahoma to reverse the long-standing Utah position. 
Reliance on Ross v. Oklahoma would subject Mr. Suarez at this late 
date to additional requirements and burdens not placed on defendants 
prior to the opinion. Had counsel been aware of the additional 
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right only now imposed by Ross v. Oklahoma, the additional challenge 
to a panel member or members might have been forthcoming. 
Accordingly, Mr. Suarez urges this Court to uphold and 
follow the Utah Supreme Court's rulings that reversible error occurs 
whenever an accused is forced to use a peremptory challenge to 
remove from the jury venire a juror who should have been removed by 
the requested challenge for cause. Mr. Wolford should have been 
removed for cause. A peremptory challenge was utilized to correct 
the Court's denial to do so; therefore, prejudice resulted to 
Mr. Suarez mandating reversal of his conviction. 
III. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AGAINST 
MR. SUAREZ FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
The standard employed for reviewing the sufficiency of 
evidence and reversing a jury verdict is well established. In 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated, "[N]ot withstanding the presumptions in favor of the 
jury's decision, this court still has the right to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict." Further, the 
Court noted: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he was convicted. 
Id. This Court has adopted this very same standard for reviewing 
cases for sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Garcia, 744 P.2d 
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1029, 1030 (Utah App. 1987). This standard restates the due process 
requirement which prohibits a criminal conviction in any case except 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970); State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1988). 
Mr. Suarez was charged by Information with violating Utah 
Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended) in that he wassaulted Leon L. 
Boone, and intentionally caused serious bodily injury to Leon L. 
Boone; and/or assaulted Leon L. Boone, by the use of a deadly 
weapon, to wit: a knife; and/or assaulted Leon L. Boone, by the use 
of such means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury []" (R. 14). The paralleling statutory language states: 
76-5-103. Aggravated Assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if 
he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 
and: 
(a) He intentionally causes serious 
bodily injury to another; or 
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such 
means or force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury. 
Necessarily, the State must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
each of the elements of assault2 as well as either of the 
alternative elements articulated above. Additionally, Mr. Suarez 
raised the defense of habitation and self-defense as justification 
for his actions, thereby necessitating that the State also prove 
2 Assault is defined by Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102 as [a] 
an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; or [b] a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to another. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of either defense. 
A. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO NEGATE 
MR. SUAREZ'S JUSTIFICATION OF DEFENSE OF 
HABITATION AND/OR SELF-DEFENSE. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 
211, 214 (Utah 1985), that whenever there is a basis in the evidence 
whether provided by the prosecution or the defendant which allows 
some reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that [an aggravated 
assault] was committed to protect the defendant from an imminent 
threat by another, an instruction on self-defense [and defense of 
habitation] should be given to the jury. Mr. Suarez claimed 
justification for his behavior based on the defense of habitation 
and self-defense, and the trial court properly allowed instructions 
to be given to the jury on both (R. 82-84). The Utah Legislature 
has identified self-defense and defense of habitation as 
justification excluding criminal responsibility. Utah Code Ann. 
§76-2-402 in pertinent part defines self-defense as follows: 
76-2-402. Force in defense of person. 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or 
using force against another when and to the extent 
that he reasonably believes that such force is 
necessary to defend himself or a third person 
against such other's imminent use of unlawful 
force; however, a person is justified in using 
force which is intended or likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury only if he reasonably 
believes that the force is necessary to prevent 
death or serious bodily injury to himself or a 
third person, or to prevent the commission of a 
forcible felony. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402 (1953 as amended). The defense of 
habitation is defined as follows: 
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76-2-405. Force in defense of habitation. 
(1) A person is justified in using force 
against another when and to the extent that he 
reasonably believes that the force is necessary to 
prevent or terminate the other's unlawful entry 
into or attack upon his habitation; however, he is 
justified in the use of force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury 
only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted 
in a violent and tumultuous manner, 
surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he 
reasonably believes that the entry is 
attempted or made for the purpose of 
assaulting or offering personal violence to 
any person, dwelling, or being in the 
habitation and he reasonably believes that 
the force is necessary to prevent the 
assault or offer of personal violence; or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the 
entry is made or attempted for the purpose 
of commiting a felony in the habitation and 
that the force is necessary to prevent the 
commission of the felony. 
(2) A person using force or deadly force 
in defense of habitation is presumed for the 
purpose of both civil and criminal cases to have 
acted reasonably and had a reasonable fear of 
imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury 
if the entry or attempted entry is unlawful and is 
made or attempted by use of force, or in a violent 
and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by 
stealth, or for the purpose of commiting a felony. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-405 (Supp. 1988). 
At trial, Mr. Suarez testified that Mr. Boone entered his 
home abruptly and approached him and his wife who were arguing and 
that Mr. Boone thrust himself between them and elbowed Mr. Suarez 
away, nearly knocking him on top of his young daughter (R. 110 at 
38-41, 51-53). It was only then that Mr. Suarez, with his camera 
still in hand, pushed Mr. Boone with his left hand to get him out 
the door. The camera shattered on impact (R. 110 at 52-53). 
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Mr. Suarez additionally attempted to kick Mr. Boone but missed 
because Mr. Boone was falling backward (R. 110 at 52-53). This 
testimony of Mr. Suarez was totally corroborated by the testimony of 
police officer Chris Housley for the State. She admitted that 
immediately after the incident, she interviewed Mr. Boone at the 
hospital and Mr. Boone stated that he indeed had entered the 
apartment and physically tried to restrain the argument by 
interjecting himself between the couple and pushing Mr. Suarez 
(R. 110 at 10-11). 
The testimony of Mr. Suarez and Officer Chris Housley is 
more than enough to meet the statutory definition of force in 
defense of habitation as described in §76-2-405(1)(a) outlined 
above. Although Mr. Boone and his wife, Pat Poleviyaoma, testified 
that Mr. Boone had not entered the apartment more than two steps, 
the totality of their testimony is insufficient to rebut the 
presumption that Mr. Suarez acted reasonably in light of 
§76-2-405(2) outlined above. 
In light of the testimony as presented at trial and the 
presumption in favor of Mr. Suarez as well as the burden of proof 
beyond the reasonable doubt standard on the prosecution, reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant 
committed the crime under circumstances other than self-defense or 
defense of habitation. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d at 444. 
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B. THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT MR. SUAREZ USED A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON. 
After the State completed its case in chief, Mr. Suarez 
moved to dismiss the charges against him inasmuch as the State had 
failed to produce a prima facie case of Aggravated Assault (R. 110 
at 24-28). The trial court, however, denied that motion (R. 110 at 
28). The State conceded in their opening statement that this case 
was based on circumstantial evidence, that indeed no knife was ever 
found or seen (R. 109 at 23). The testimony adduced at trial 
supported that claim inasmuch as Mr. Boone and Ms. Poleviyaoma 
testified that they had never seen anything in Mr. Suarezfs hands 
(R. 109 at 60, 74, 86). In opposing the motion to dismiss, the 
prosecutor stated: 
I think the test at this point is this evidence 
the jury would wilfully believe a knife was used 
and, I think that although no knife was seen, the 
wound itself, manner of the testimony about the 
blow, and all that would—well, circumstantial 
evidence, but good evidence. Just as the court 
indicated in its opening instructions that the 
jury, though a knife was never seenf nor direct 
evidence of that, it's certainly reasonable that 
the jury could conclude that a knife was used in 
this particular instance. And I don't think 
there's any requirement that the knife be in 
evidence or be found or anything like that (R. 110 
at 27-28). 
The trial court ruled: 
The court finds that the nature of the 
confrontation is adequately described by the 
witnesses, is sufficient for the jury to determine 
whether a deadly weapon was used and the jury 
could easily find that such was indeed the case 
based upon the observations of [Mr. Boone's] chest 
and the description of [Mr. Boone] and other 
witnesses in relation to the nature of the contact 
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between the defendant and the victim is consistent 
with the use of a deadly weapon (R. 110 at 28). 
Mr. Suarez contends that the assumptions of both the prosecutor and 
the trial court in this case required that the jury impermissibly 
speculate as to the nature of the wound. 
The only evidence actually submitted on the question of 
the possible weapon was the testimony of Mr. Suarez, who indicated 
the only thing in his hand was a small camera which broke on impact 
(R. 110 at 53). Mr. Boone testified that he did not feel anything 
and that he believed Mr. Suarezfs hand was a closed fist (R. 109 at 
37). No testimony whatsoever was introduced as to the nature of the 
wound being consistent with that of a knife. The prosecutor, 
however, did expose the jury to "his own testimony" on this issue. 
In closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 
Now, you may say well, why didn't Leon know he got 
stabbed until later? That's not unusual. Sharp 
knives—the concentration is on the blow and you 
don't feel what's going on. I've had a 
circumstance where I walked around for about 
forty-five minutes with a pen stuck in me that far 
[gesturing] and I didn't realize it and I just had 
an itch and I pulled it out and it started 
bleeding. I didn't know I had it in there for 
about forty-five minutes. That happens. I can't 
explain it. I'm not a doctor but that happens. 
And so I submit the truth is it was the defendant 
who stabbed Mr. Boone in the chest with a 
knife, . . . that the stabbing, there was use of a 
deadly weapon or such means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury, or 
whatever it was. I believe it was a knife. That 
is a weapon, that's a deadly weapon. That's 
something that can't be changed because we have 
the wound. We know that happened (R. 110 at 
65-66). 
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These comments by the prosecutor provide what was otherwise absent 
from his case—evidence substantiating the consistency of the wound 
with that of a weapon, a knife. 
The prosecutor's statements were inappropriate and 
prejudicial. See generally State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 485-86 
(Utah 1984) (if prosecutor's remarks call to the attention of jurors 
matters outside the evidence which they would not be justified in 
considering and if those remarks probably influenced their decision 
in the case, a reversal is warranted). The inappropriate remarks, 
however, importantly disclose the insufficiency of evidence existing 
in the State's case, to wit: the prosecution presented no evidence 
of a scientific nature to support that the wound was consistent with 
a knife. The absence of that evidence required the jurors to 
speculate on an essential element of the charge which the 
prosecution is obliged to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In Salt Lake City School District v. Galbraith & Green, 
Inc., 740 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1987), this Court stated: 
If the matter at issue in the case is one which 
requires special knowledge not held by the trier 
of fact, expert evidence must be presented. If, 
however, the matter is one which is within the 
knowledge of the average trier of fact, no expert 
testimony is required. 
Id. at 289 (citations omitted). Mr. Suarez urges that it is not 
within the knowledge of the average juror to view a scar on the 
chest of Mr. Boone and determine it could only have been made by a 
knife as alleged by the State. This is especially true in this case 
where no witness viewed a knife, no knife was found, and the only 
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testimony adduced at trial on the question of what may have made the 
wound was Mr. Suarez's testimony that he was holding the small 
instamatic camera in his hand which shattered on impact when he 
pushed at Mr. Boone (R. 110 at 52-53). 
While this Court conceded in Salt Lake City School 
District v. Galbraith & Greenf Inc. that no expert testimony is 
required if the other evidence is such as to present the issues in 
terms the jury can understand and draw correct conclusions 
therefrom, 740 P.2d at 289/ no such evidence was presented in this 
case. All the jurors knew from the evidence was that Mr. Boone had 
a half-inch scar on his chest where Mr. Suarez had punched him with 
either a closed fist or a closed fist holding a camera which 
shattered on impact and a smaller scar where the doctors placed a 
chest tube (R. 109 at 41-42). Jurors also knew that Mr. Boone felt 
nothing but the push of the fist—he discovered he was bleeding only 
after he was outside—and that he spent approximately four days in 
the hosptial (R. 109 at 37, 39-41, 57-58). This evidence alone is 
insufficient to establish a requisite element of the State's case. 
The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a knife was 
used when it did not produce expert testimony to establish that the 
wound on Mr. Boone's chest was consistent with an otherwise unseen 
and unfound alleged knife. The jurors were impermissibly left to 
speculate whether a knife had been used. 
Absent any expert testimony to support that assertion by 
the State, the evidence is left sufficiently inconclusive and 
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have 
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entertained a reasonable doubt that Mr. Suarez committed the crime 
of which he was convicted, and this Court, in reviewing the 
evidence, may not take a speculative leap across that gap of 
evidence to sustain the verdict. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d at 
444-45. 
Accordingly, Mr. Suarez requests this Court to vacate the 
conviction against him, reaffirming that the prosecution must meet 
their burden and prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of 
each and every element of the crime. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this / •*• day of February, 1989. 
ftL. C U £C( •'//-, L. 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attornejz—for Defendant/Appellant 
RICHARD G. UDA1 
Attorney for Defendaat/Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
-VS-
GILBERTO DIEGO SUAREZ, 
DEFENDANT. 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 







CRIMINAL NO. CR-88-307 
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT: 
JURY SELECTION VOIR DIRE 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THURSDAY, THE 31ST DAY 
OF MARCH, 1988, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 2:10 O'CLOCK P.M., 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE COURT-
ROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DSITRICT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
FILED m CLERKS OFFICE 
Sett Lake County
 U t a h 
D
^C 2H 1SC3 
p" D%g%%,9y> yy&OvL Court 
Deputy c.'8fk 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
1 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. ANYONE ELSE? 
2 THERE APPEARS TO BE NO AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE. 
3 IS THERE ANYONE HERE WHO WOULD HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY 
4 IF THE COURT WERE TO GIVE YOU INSTRUCTIONS IN THE LAW, IN 
5 FOLLOWING THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT, IF YOU FELT THAT THE 
6 LAW SHOULD BE DIFFERENT, FOR INSTANCE? ARE YOU WILLING TO 
7 FOLLOW THE LAW AS INSTRUCTED BY THE COURT? ANYONE'WHO IS 
8 NOT? IF SO, WOULD YOU RAISE YOUR HAND? 
9 THERE APPEARS TO BE NO AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE. 
10 DO ANY OF YOU HAVE ANY UNIQUE HEALTH PROBLEMS 
11 OR CHALLENGES THAT COULD CREATE DIFFICULTY ASSOCIATED WITH 
12 REMAINING AS A JUROR DURING THE NEXT TWO DAYS? IF SO, WOULD 
13 YOU RAISE YOUR HAND? 
14 THERE APPEARS TO BE NO AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE. 
15 ARE THERE ANY OF YOU WHO ARE ACQUAINTED WITH 
16 POLICE OFFICERS OR RELATED CLOSELY TO POLICE OFFICERS? 
17 IF SO, WOULD YOU RAISE YOUR HAND? 
18 MS. ELIASON? 
19 MS. ELIASON: I HAVE A BROTHER THAT'S A MARSHALL. 
20 JUDGE YOUNG: UNITED STATES MARSHALL? 
21 MS. ELIASON: OF THE TOWN OF ALTA. 
22 JUDGE YOUNG: WOULD YOUR FAMILIARITY WITH YOUR 
23 BROTHER AND HIS POLICE RESPONSIBILITIES CAUSE YOU FOR ANY | 
2 4




1 MS. ELIASON: NO. 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: MS. LLOYD? 
3 MS. LLOYD: I HAVE A BROTHER-IN-LAW WHO'S A 
4 DETECTIVE AND TWO CLOSE FRIENDS WHO ARE ON THE SALT LAKE 
5 POLICE FORCE. 
6 JUDGE YOUNG: WOULD YOUR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THOSE 
7 PERSONS CAUSE YOU TO FEEL YOU COULD NOT BE FAIR AND IMPAR-
8 TIAL IN THIS CASE? 
9 \ MS. LLOYD: MAYBE. 
10 JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT GIVES YOU REASON TO SAY MAYBE? 
11 MS. LLOYD: WELL, HE SAID THAT THREE OF HIS 
12 WITNESSES WERE POLICE OFFICERS AND--
13 JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE 
14 THAT YOU WOULD BELIEVE A POLICE OFFICER SIMPLY BECAUSE HE 
15 IS A POLICE OFFICER MORE THAN ANY OTHER CITIZEN WHO 
16 TESTIFIED? 
17 MS. LLOYD: YES, I THINK I WOULD. 
18 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU WOULD. IF YOU BELIEVED THE 
19 TESTIMONY OF TWO WITNESSES ON THIS STAND ONE OF WHOM--LET'S 
2 0
 ASSUME THE ALTERNATIVE. LET'S ASSUME THAT YOU DO NOT 
21 BELIEVE THE POLICE OFFICER BUT YOU BELIEVE THE OTHER CITIZEN 
2 2
 TESTIFYING, WOULD YOU BE INCLINED TO DISCOUNT THAT BELIEF 
2
* BECAUSE ONE WAS AN OFFICER AND THUS BELIEVE HIM? 
2 4
 I MS. LLOYD: NO. WELL--I DON'T KNOW. 




























WHO HAVE MORE CREDIBILITY SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE JOB THEY 
HAVE THAN BECAUSE OF THE TESTIMONY THEY GIVE? 
MS. LLOYD: I GUESS NOT. IT'S JUST I REALLY 
WOULD--I DON'T KNOW. I DON'T THINK MORE HONEST BECAUSE 
HE IS A POLICE OFFICER BUT I HAVE KNOWN POLICE OFFICERS 
WHO HAVE HAD--WHO, YOU KNOW-
JUDGE YOUNG: YOU'VE KNOWN OF POLICE OFFICERS 
WHO HAVE BEEN HONEST? 
MS. LLOYD: YES. WELL, YES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THAT'S NOT UNUSUAL. 
MS. LLOYD: AND WITNESSES HAVE LIED. 
JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU KNOW OF POLICE OFFICERS 
WHO HAVE BEEN DISHONEST? 
MS. LLOYD: NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE, NO. 
JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU THINK THERE'S EVER BEEN 
A POLICE OFFICER CONVICTED OF A CRIME? 
MS. LLOYD: I'M SURE THERE HAS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WOULD YOU THINK THAT WAS DISHONEST? 
MS. LLOYD: IF HE HAD BEEN CONVICTED OF A CRIME? 
JUDGE YOUNG: YES. 
MS. LLOYD: IF HE WAS DISHONEST, YES, I THINK 
HE WAS DISHONEST. 
JUDGE YOUNG: YES. 
ANYONE ELSE RESPONDING WITH YOUR ACQUAINTANCE 
WITH POLICE OFFICERS? 
17 
1 MS. CARROLL? 
2 MS. CARROLL: MY BROTHER IS A DEPUTY SHERIFF 
3 FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY BUT IT SHOULDN'T AFFECT ME IN ANY WAY. 
4
 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU DON'T THINK THAT WOULD AFFECT 
5 YOU IN ANY WAY? 
* MS. CARROLL: NO. 
1 JUDGE YOUNG: WOULD YOU BE INCLINED TO BELIEVE 
8 A POLICE OFFICER MORE THAN ANYONE ELSE? 
' MS. CARROLL: IF IT WAS MY BROTHER. 
10 JUDGE YOUNG: YOUR BROTHER HASN'T BEEN CALLED 
11 TO TESTIFY. MR. REES? 
12 MS. CARROLL: YES, SIR. 
13 MR. REES: I WORKED FOR THREE YEARS FOR THE 
14 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AT THE PRISON AS A STAFF PSYCHO-
15 LOGIST. I STILL CARRY A NUMBER OF FRIENDS WHO ARE PEACE 
16 OFFICERS. 
17 JUDGE YOUNG: WOULD YOU BE INCLINED TO BELIEVE 
18
 YOUR FRIENDS BECAUSE THEY ARE PEACE OFFICERS MORE THAN SIMPLY] 
19 ANOTHER CITIZEN? 
2 0
 MR. REES: NO. 
21 JUDGE YOUNG: SO THE MERE FACT THEY ARE POLICE 
2 2
 I OFFICERS WOULD NOT AFFECT YOUR ABILITY TO WEIGH THEIR TESTI-
MONY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. REES: I'VE WORKED WITH ENOUGH OF THEM THAT 





1 JUDGE YOUNG: ANYONE ELSE? 
2 MR. WOLFORD? 
3 MR. WOLFORD: YES. I KNOW ONE OF THE SALT LAKE 
4 COUNTY DEPUTIES QUITE WELL. HE'S IN MY BISHOPRIC AND EVERY-
5 THING. 
6 JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT'S HIS NAME? 
7 MR. WOLFORD: JIM GRANT. 
8 JUDGE YOUNG: WOULD YOU BE INCLINED--WOULD YOUR 
9 ACQUAINTANCE WITH JIM GRANT CAUSE YOU FOR ANY REASON TO 
10 FEEL YOU COULD NOT BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL IN THIS CASE? 
11 MR. WOLFORD: NO. 
12 JUDGE YOUNG: ANYONE ELSE? 
13 MR. SAGER? 
14 MR. SAGER: I HAVE TWO CLOSE FRIENDS THAT ARE 
15 HIGHWAY PATROLMEN. 
16 JUDGE YOUNG: WOULD YOUR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THOSE 
17 FRIENDS CAUSE YOU FOR ANY REASON TO FEEL YOU COULD NOT BE 
1 8
 FAIR AND IMPARTIAL IN THIS CASE? 
19 MR. SAGER: NO. 
20 JUDGE YOUNG: MS. WHITE? 
21 MS. WHITE: I HAVE A CLOSE FRIEND WHO IS A PEACE 
2 2
 OFFICER. 
23 JUDGE YOUNG: WOULD YOUR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THAT 
2 4
 I FRIEND CAUSE YOU FOR ANY REASON TO BELIEVE YOU COULD NOT 
BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL IN THIS CASE? 
19 
25 
1 MS. WHITE: NO. 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: MR. HAYFORD? 
3 MR. HAYFORD: WE HAVE HAD A COUPLE OF GUYS IN 
4 OUR WARD THAT WAS POLICE OFFICERS. ONE WAS OFFICER CLAYTON 
5 AND THE OTHER ONE IS RETIRED. HIS NAME WAS ETHERLY. 
$ JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU BELIEVE YOUR ACQUAINTANCE 
7 WITH THOSE OFFICERS WOULD CAUSE YOU FOR ANY REASON TO FEEL 
8 YOU COULD NOT BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL IN THIS CASE? 
9 \ MR. HAYFORD: NO. 
10 JUDGE YOUNG: ANYONE ELSE RESPONDING IN GENERAL 
11 TO THE QUESTION ASKED? 
12 THERE APPEARS TO BE NO AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE. 
13 LET ME ASK THE BROAD QUESTION, WHICH I THINK 
14 I'VE PERHAPS ALLUDED TO WITH THE REST OF YOU, BUT ARE THERE 
15 ANY OF YOU WHO WOULD BELIEVE THAT THE TESTIMONY OR WEIGHT 
16 OF TESTIMONY OF AN OFFICER SHOULD BE WEIGHED GREATER THAN 
17 THE TESTIMONY OF ANOTHER CITIZEN FOR ANY REASON? AND I 
*
8
 WOULD INCLUDE THE INVERSE OF THAT. IS THERE ANYONE WHO 
19 WOULD BELIEVE AN OFFICER'S TESTIMONY SHOULD BE WEIGHED LESS 
20 THAN ANY OTHER CITIZEN? 
21 THERE APPEARS TO BE NO AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE. 
22 I HAVE YOU OR YOUR CLOSE FRIENDS OR RELATIVES BEEN 
THE VICTIMS OF A CRIME? IF SO, WOULD YOU RAISE YOUR HAND? 23 
2 4
 MS. SONNTAG: APRIL OF ' 8 7 WE HAD A CAR THEFT 
25 FROM THE FRONT OF OUR HOME. 
20 
